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This Article focuses on battles around legal education reform, which have long 
played a strategic role in competing law and development efforts around the world. 
There are numerous books and articles now emerging to discuss what global law 
schools should be, what kind of teaching and clinical programs make for best 
practices, the quality of academic research, and the possibilities of access into the legal 
profession.1 The specific institutional focus of the studies—on categories such as the 
bar, the solicitors branch, faculties of law and law schools, judges, or even the “legal 
complex”—tends to neglect processes of capital conversion that characterize the law 
and lawyers in different settings. The categories must be deconstructed to see what 
goes into the law and the legal profession. One way to see processes of transformation 
and capital conversion is to draw on interconnected histories that reveal similarities 
and differences. 
* Yves Dezalay is Director emeritus, CNRS (French National Center for Scientific Research). Bryant 
Garth is Chancellor’s Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
 1.  For examples of edited volumes, see LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Christopher Gane & Robin Hui Huang eds., 2016); THE 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION (Christophe Jamin & William van Caenegem eds., 
2016). 
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Our book project, from which this Article comes, focuses on three dimensions 
of a “legal revolution” in the sense employed by Harold Berman in his famous books 
on law and revolution.2 Berman began with explanations of the Gregorian revolution 
in the tenth century and then applied the same analysis to the Protestant Reformation. 
In each case, he highlighted how learned capital of relatively marginal scholarly groups 
linked to emerging political movements and ultimately provided legitimacy and 
continuity for the new regime. The new law retained a connection to the established 
powers but also took on the new forms of capital made valuable through the state and 
social transformation/revolution. Legal education and learned law are thus important 
battlegrounds in legal revolutions. 
The first dimension of the recent revolution which we focus on is a new imperial 
or hegemonic relationship, gaining power with respect to the older colonial 
relationships. It involves the ascendency of the United States globally after World War 
II and especially the end of the Cold War. With that ascendency came a revolution in 
the governance of the state and economy that diffused broadly throughout the world.3
The global rise of large corporate law firms is one key legal component of this 
revolution, which also includes deregulation and privatization.4
The second dimension is therefore the rise of what is often called the 
“financialization” of the economy, the neoliberal revolution, or the Big Bang of 
deregulation. One aspect of this transformation is a stagnation and relative 
impoverishment of the stock of public capital (which comprised state-owned 
companies, banks, and much less debt in the three decades after World War II) versus 
a huge accumulation of private capital associated with the so-called “one percent” (or 
more accurately one tenth of one percent) and a corresponding accumulation of 
government debt.5 The public and private fortunes are reversed. 
The third dimension is a transformation seen in legal education and the legal 
profession. In one sense, there is a huge proliferation of law schools in many countries 
of the world, including the United States to some extent with about 200 law schools; 
Mexico,6 Brazil,7 and India,8 each of which has more than 1,000 faculties of law; and 
2. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION (1983); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE 
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003). 
3.   For a more detailed discussion of the diffusion of U.S.-style economics and law, see YVES 
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS,
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002). 
4.   The spread of corporate law firms is the focus of the Project on Globalization Lawyers 
and Emerging Economies (“GLEE”) at Harvard Law School’s Center for the Legal Profession. See
THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF THE 
CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY (Luciana Gross Cunha et 
al. eds., 2018); THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF 
THE CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY (David B. Wilkins et 
al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION]. 
5.  See Thomas Piketty, Public Capital, Private Capital, LE MONDE: LE BLOG DE THOMAS 
PIKETTY (Mar. 14, 2017), http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2017/03/14/public-capital-private-capital/. 
6.   See Luis Fernando Perez Hurtado, Content, Structure, and Growth of Mexican Legal Education,
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China, with some 600 law schools.9 The legal professions of places such as Japan,10
Korea,11 and Hong Kong12 have also grown substantially even if relatively small 
compared to the others. From one perspective, the proliferation suggests a growing 
openness to the legal profession and an increase in the importance of law in state 
governance. Yet the story also parallels the story of financialization. There is a vast 
difference between the very few institutions at the top and the numerous institutions 
at the bottom. 
Many of the elite public schools are relatively open on the basis of meritocratic 
criteria, but it is extremely difficult to get into them unless one comes from a family 
able to put resources into costly primary and secondary schools.13  And the tuitions 
and fees are going up for many of the public schools which compete with a new 
cohort of private schools that have entered the markets with the aim largely of 
producing corporate lawyers.14 In any event, the differences between the elite and 
rank-and-file are dramatic. 
In the United States, for example, law professors at elite schools make triple the 
salaries of those at low ranked schools, and law graduates able to obtain corporate law 
jobs start their careers at more than double the salaries of those who start in the 
government or in small firms, with the gap increasing over time.15 The percentage of 
law graduates starting at corporate law firms of more than 250 lawyers, according to 
the After the JD (AJD) longitudinal study of law graduates who commenced their 
careers in 2000, was about 18 percent at a time of a good market in the United States, 
and the percentage remaining in such firms at year thirteen was about 8 percent (and 
there are also substantial differences between the firms that have more than 250 
lawyers).16 The elite equity partners at the US firms come disproportionately from elite 
schools. There are therefore “magic circles” in law firms and in law schools that 
59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 567, 584 (2010) (referring to more than 1,000 law schools).
7.   See Oscar Vilhena Vieira & José Garcez Ghirardi, The Unstoppable Force, the Immovable Object: 
Challenges for Structuring a Cosmopolitan Legal Education in Brazil, 3 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L &
COMP. L. 119, 119-142 (2018)(referring to more than 1,300 law schools). 
8.   See Jonathan Gingerich & Nick Robinson, Responding to the Market: The Impact of the Rise of 
Corporate Law Firms on Elite Legal Education in India, in THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, 
at 519, 521 (referring to more than 1390 law schools). 
9.  See Zhizhou Wang et al., Internationalizing Chinese Legal Education in the Early Twenty-First 
Century, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 237, 237 (2017). 
10. See Dan Rosen, Japan’s Law School System: The Sorrow and the Pity, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 267, 
288 (2017). 
11. Jae-Hyup Lee, Legal Education in Korea: Some Thoughts on Linking the Past and the Future, 44
KYUNG HEE L. REV. 605, 610 (2009). 
12. Carol Jones, Producing the Producers: Legal Education in Hong Kong’ in LEGAL EDUCATION 
IN ASIA (S. Steele & K. Taylor eds., 2009). 
13. Text and notes 43-48 infra.
14. Text and notes 43-48 infra.
15. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY 
OF LEGAL CAREERS 41–44 (2004). 
16. See Ronit Dinovitzer, Practice Setting, in AFTER THE JD III: THIRD RESULTS FROM A 
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 26, 26 (2014). 
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disproportionately reap the profits of business law (and also public interest law). The 
key lawyers arguing in the supreme court and taking major positions in government 
come from the same elite circles.17
We do not have specific comparable data on other countries, but the differences 
are certainly as great given the gaps between the leading law schools and a mass of 
marginal schools. Further, the numbers of those who work in the so-called corporate 
hemisphere are relatively smaller, and the opportunity to gain access to the large 
corporate law firms from non-English speaking countries depends also on knowledge 
of English, which relates also to one’s social position and ability to travel. There are 
strong social, financial, and cultural barriers to entry into these internationally-oriented 
corporate law firms and even to the faculties of law that train their recruits. 
The legal revolution that goes with the revolution in governance, involving law 
schools, faculties of law, and corporate law firms, can be seen more specifically as part 
of a contested process—with legal education as a key battleground. There are both 
entrenched and even embattled elites resisting the forces promoting change as well as 
elites using multiple positions and connections to absorb and solidify the changes. In 
many situations, the process of change is exacerbated by what can be seen as a relative 
decline in the value of scholarly capital in comparison to family and social capital. The 
decline makes it easier for new groups to ally with emerging but marginal scholarly 
communities bringing new investment in scholarship. The new system supported by 
the reformers is more embedded in finance and markets, and more academically 
selective about who obtains the key positions. It represents a key tool in reconfiguring 
academia and in the relation between academia and practice in different countries. The 
local battles about law and legal education then depend on a mix of professional and 
social hierarchies and relationships to hegemonic powers. 
South and East Asia provide a nice setting for exploring these processes. Indeed, 
we focus on Asia in the larger project because it is at the core of the revolution that we 
wish to analyze. It combines colonial legacies embedded in powerfully entrenched and 
homogeneous legal hierarchies and institutions—notably the grand advocates in India, 
the Judicial Research and Training Institute in Korea (“JRTI”), and the Legal Research 
and Training Institute (“LRTI”) in Japan. More generally, in four of the five countries 
we focus on in the larger work, which includes Hong Kong and China as well, there is 
a traditional alliance between an elite bar and high judges, with academics in a largely 
subordinate position. There is a rise of newcomers (outsiders) both in international 
law firms and in local clones of US corporate law firms, building on a powerful mix of 
outside resources (including global finance, Ivy League campuses, and legacies of Cold 
War hegemony). 
These new sites for the reproduction of producers and diffusion/importation of 
new forms of financial/legal excellence complement each other in the relative success 
17.  Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS: REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Dec. 8, 2014, 
10:30 A.M.), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/. 
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of this offensive. The two camps and their resources are relatively well defined, but the 
outcome of these battles differs depending on their respective strengths in each 
setting. And apart from Japan,18 it seems that the old guard is mainly fighting a rear-
guard battle which aims at delaying and restricting the entry to the inner core hierarchy 
of judicial institutions while also slowing the rise of the newcomers. In each case, in 
addition, defensive strategies risk backfiring and promoting a diaspora of ambitious 
and well-connected law graduates. The case study of India provides a particularly vivid 
illustration of such battles. 
The general theoretical framework of this Article and the book project which 
will follow sees law as a cultural bank holding symbolic capital. This phenomenon is 
easy to see in India. The power and history of the Parsi and the Brahmins are 
embedded within Indian law as family capital.19 The connections to the state here as 
elsewhere are also part of the value of legal capital, as are connections to the leading 
family businesses and landowning families. Family capital can be converted into other 
forms of capital that become more important at particular times and in particular 
places, such as moving from law into economics and land into finance. Law and the 
institutions in the legal field provide places of exchange for capital conversion. The 
hierarchies within the field also determine receptivity to new forms of capital including 
both learned capital and family capital. The elite of the bench and bar in India are at 
the top of the profession and guard the temple of Indian law.20 In the United States, in 
contrast, corporate lawyers are in the dominant role. Other countries have different 
hierarchies. 
From the beginning of law and development in the 1950s, the US approach has 
been to challenge the existing guardians of the temple outside the United States in 
order to promote universals consistent with US hegemony. US foundations and others 
have sought to “modernize” legal elites to become moderate leaders in development 
and governance instead of conservative backers of a propertied class seen as enemies 
of reform development. The stories of legal education reform are therefore 
combinations of export efforts and import efforts that may disagree in many 
respects—but unite in seeking to disrupt the existing hierarchies and upgrade the 
quality of legal argument and legal scholarship.21
18. See Rosen, supra note 10, at 271–72.
19. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE 
SHADOW OF EMPIRE 66–75 (2010); MITRA SHARAFI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN COLONIAL SOUTH 
ASIA: PARSI LEGAL CULTURE, 1772–1947, at 6–7 (2014). 
20. See Marc Galanter & Nick Robinson, Grand Advocates: The Traditional Elite Lawyers, in THE
INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 455–85. 
21. On India, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, From the ALI to the ILI: The Efforts to Export an American 
Legal Institution, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 1293 (2005) [hereinafter, Krishnan, From the ALI 
to the ILI]; Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford Foundation, 
and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447, 448 (2004) [hereinafter 
Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi]. On Brazil, see JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM:
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 13, 17 (1980); Vieira and Ghirardi, 
supra note 7. 
148 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol.  3:143 
INDIA: COLONIAL PATH DEPENDENCIES REVISITED: AN EMBATTLED SENIOR BAR,
THE MARGINALIZATION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, AND INTERNATIONALIZED 
CHALLENGERS
Recent accounts of the Indian legal profession note the powerful position of the 
grand advocates, an elite of high court and supreme court barristers who operate in 
tandem with the elite judiciary. Galanter and Robinson note that India’s grand 
advocates are an “elite handful of lawyers” that have “flourished in the age of 
globalization.”22 Wilkins and Khanna note the perception among in-house counsel 
that “a small number of Grand Advocates . . . dominate the Indian advocacy 
market”—essential especially “when the stakes were high.”23  Ballakrishnen’s recent 
report on India notes that the story of the bar is one of continuity, with familial capital 
remaining important and limiting entry to the flourishing elite barrister practices.24 The 
corporate law firms, Ballakrishnen also finds, have changed. They broke somewhat 
with their historical path and became relatively meritocratic without the overt gender 
bias dominant in the bar.25
The bar appears therefore to be an example of highly restricted entry—control 
over the market—among a relatively small group for which family capital is critical to 
get access to a pupillage. The top advocates reap substantial monopoly profits. The 
corporate bar, except for the leaders and dominant partners of the top firms,26 does 
not do quite as well, but it too is relatively prosperous compared to those who make 
up the rank-and-file of the profession. And in contrast to the advocates in the bar, the 
corporate firms hire on relatively meritocratic grounds. In particular, they provide 
lucrative jobs for those who graduate from the relatively new and meritocratic national 
law schools.27
The scholarly accounts described above each emphasize one aspect of the 
current situation, highlighting the contrast between the two sectors —the bar and the 
corporate law firms. Our account relates the two accounts and emphasizes also that 
the Indian legal aristocracy was built through colonialism and has always existed in a 
peripheral, dominated relationship. The Indian legal aristocracy has tended to be quite 
conservative except in relation to support for the independence movement. The great 
wealth of the “Nabobs of the law” prior to independence and during the golden age of 
the bar after independence depended on connections to the British legal core and on 
22. Galanter & Robinson, supra note 20, at 455. 
23. David B. Wilkins & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Globalization and the Rise of the In-House Counsel 
Movement in India, in THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 114, 146. 
24. See S.S. Ballakrishnen, Present and Future: A Revised Sociological Portrait of the Indian Legal 
Profession, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY PROJECT 1, 16–17 (2017). 
25. Id.
26. Interview No. 1 (Email) (July 2017). 
27. See Jonathan Gingerich & Nick Robinson, Responding to the Market: The Impact of the Rise of 
Corporate Law Firms on Elite Legal Education in India, in THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, 
at 519, 519–47.
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service on behalf of large landholders.28 The conservatism of the legal elite led Nehru 
to accuse the bench and bar of engineering a “purloined state” characterized by attacks 
in the courts on Nehru’s progressive policies in the 1950s and 1960s.29 The elite of the 
bar, with a few exceptions, resisted policies that would reduce the power of their 
traditional clients. 
The bunker mentality adopted by the traditional legal elite, protecting itself and 
its market, helped to depreciate the prestige of law and legal careers. As was well 
documented in the 1960s and 1970s, law was not the choice of talented individuals 
without strong family contacts in the legal profession, despite efforts of the Ford 
Foundation and others to find a point of entry to improve teaching and scholarly 
research as a way to modernize the profession.30 The best students chose engineering 
or medicine rather than law, with the Indian Institutes of Technology providing a well-
documented point of entry for those able to excel on the entrance examinations. 
Criticisms of the conservatism of the legal profession opened up possibilities for 
new ideas and contacts seeking to adapt to and ally with new local and global 
governing hierarchies. In particular, as discussed more below, entrepreneurs in law 
took advantage of a hegemonic restructuring that increased the relative value of U.S. 
made-and-exported legal expertise. The period after the emergency declared by Indira 
Gandhi in the mid-1970s was a key period for this entrepreneurship. 
The support of the Indian Supreme Court for the emergency gave rise to a larger 
reformist element among the legal elite, and that opposition provided an opportunity 
to regain the bar’s stature. Led by entrepreneurial activists in the bench and bar, the 
Supreme Court itself and the senior bar improved their image with the development 
of public interest litigation with some assistance from the Ford Foundation.31 The 
timing also made more salient the existing momentum for reform of legal education 
centered at the University of Delhi. In particular, the idea of a new national law school 
outside of the existing law faculties gained support from Upendra Baxi’s critique and 
suggestions for reform, published later.32 It also drew on the successes of the Indian 
institutes of technology and the Indian institutes of management, themselves in part 
inspired by US higher education. 
Baxi, the best known Indian legal academic, obtained an SJD from the 
University of California, Berkeley, taught in Australia, and then came back to the 
University of Delhi. He taught from the 1970s to mid-1990s there, served as dean and 
in many other capacities, and moved to the University of Warwick in the mid-1990s. 
His career is closely connected to the rise of public interest litigation and the 
development of the national law schools. The following quote taken from a recently 
28.  DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 151–57. 
29.  Id.
30.  Id.; see also Krishnan, From the ALI to the ILI, supra note 21; Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield 
Goes to Delhi, supra note 21. 
31.  See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 186–188.
32.  Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi, supra note 21, at 481–82; Upendra Baxi, Notes 
Towards a Socially Relevant Legal Education, 5 J.B. COUNCIL INDIA, 1975–1976, at 1, 20 (1976). 
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published examination of the founding of the national law schools notes the impact of 
Baxi and elite members of the bar and judiciary: 
Justice M. Hidayatullah spearheaded the concept of a Law School on the 
lines of Harvard Law School, which would be led by a diverse and dedicated 
group of faculty and law scholars, would be autonomous in nature, 
completely self-financed, not take any financial aid from Government or 
regulatory bodies and in turn not permit their interference. The vision of 
Justice Hidayatullah was discussed in a number of LEC meetings. Prof. 
Upendra Baxi, eminent jurist who was [sic] co-opted member of LEC 
undertook the spadework and the entire legal education scenario of the 
country was set to undergo a metamorphosis.33
The aspiration was to create an Indian version of Harvard. 
After a set of events well documented by Krishnan,34 N.R. Madhava Menon, a 
protégé of Justice Krishna Iyer, one of the leaders of public interest litigation on the 
Indian Supreme Court, established the National Law School of India University 
(“NSLIU”), the first national law school (“NLS”), located in Bangalore.35 Since that 
time he has been one of the key promoters of legal education reform. Menon has 
written an autobiography of his experience as a founder.36
The five-year curriculum, Menon noted, was inspired largely by US law schools 
and was much more rigorous than the three-year BA of the existing law faculties. The 
school also had very limited resources when it opened in 1987, but the Ford 
Foundation, which had long hoped to upgrade legal education and scholarship in 
India, stepped in with an $800,000 grant “at a crucial time when the law school was 
finding it difficult to continue operations (i.e.1989-1994).”37 The fortuitous timing of 
the NLSIU helped ensure its success but turned it away from the initial mandate to 
create a new generation of advocates aligned with public interest litigation. The first 
graduates emerged just after economic liberalization, and they instead eagerly 
embraced the new opportunities in the corporate law firms. 
An international team, including Marc Galanter, William Twining, and Savitri 
Gunasekhere from Colombo, reviewed the achievements of NLSIU and concluded 
that it had “fully met the objectives of being a centre of excellence that serves as a 
pace setter for Indian legal education.”38 The success of NLSIU then inspired the 
national law school in Hyderabad (officially the National Academy of Legal Studies 
and Research (“NALSAR”)), which opened in 1998, and then the model really took 
off. There are now some twenty-one national law schools spread throughout India—
with varying claims to affinity with the original model. The national law schools have 
33.  Justice N.N. Mathur, National Law Universities, Original Intent & Real Founders, LIVE LAW
(July 24, 2017, 7:58 P.M.), http://www.livelaw.in/national-law-universities-original-intent-real 
-founders/ (emphasis omitted). 
34.  Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi, supra note 21, at 484–88. 
35.  N.R. MADHAVA MENON, TURNING POINT: THE STORY OF A LAW TEACHER (2009). 
36.  Id.
37.  Id. at 52. 
38.  Id. at 54. 
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also influenced legal education outside of the NLS sector. The number of three-year 
LLB programs is diminishing, with relatively few prominent hold outs such as Delhi 
University and the Government Law College in Mumbai. Recently, for example, the 
Pravin Gandhi School of Law affiliated with the University of Mumbai has switched 
its emphasis to a five-year LLB program away from a three-year evening program. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities toward increasingly influential US expertise were 
further enhanced by the restructuring of the Indian economy, especially under Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh, bringing the end of the Indian “Licensing Raj” and 
opening up the economy to much more foreign trade and investment. This set of 
economic reforms opened space for new and expanded Indian solicitors firms and for 
global corporate law firms serving India from outside the country. Law firms retooled 
quite dramatically in relation to the transformation of the economy.39 Many graduates 
of the national law schools moved into these firms, and students there reportedly 
compete now for slots within the national and global corporate law firms.40 As Jay 
Krishnan noted in 2013, the law firm growth is relatively recent, reflecting the impact 
of the dramatic economic changes.41 Of the forty top firms named in a survey, eight 
started between 1991 and 1999, and fifteen began after 2000.42 To a certain extent, in 
fact, the bar complains now about the relative lack of interest among the national law 
school graduates in careers in the bar.43
The first point is that the national law schools occupy a relatively tiny niche 
within Indian legal education. We are not, therefore, examining the vast majority of 
law faculties and law graduates. There are some 1.3 million lawyers in India, more than 
1,200 law schools and faculties of law, and perhaps 45,000 law students. There are 
roughly 30,000 applications for the 1,500 to 2,000 positions in the national law 
schools.44 The Common Law Admission Test, established in 2008, allows students to 
take one examination while applying to national law schools throughout the country. 
The process is similar in this respect to the Indian institutes of technology. 
The standardized tests used by the national law schools require English 
proficiency, and the fees of about $2,500 per year deter a great number of applications 
as well. A recent study of students at NLSIU confirms that they come 
disproportionately from high incomes and high castes.45 Brahmins made up 26.5 
percent of students and other upper castes 32.5 percent, with the numbers likely 
39.  Ashish Nanda et al., Mapping India’s Corporate Law Firm Sector, in THE INDIAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 69. 
40.  Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27. 
41.  Jayath Krishnan, Peel-Off Lawyers: Legal Professionals in India’s Corporate Law Firm Sector, 9
SOCIO-LEGAL REVIEW 1, 24 n.76 (2013) (explaining that the legal services sector expanded because 
of economic liberalization). 
42.  Id. at 20. 
43.  Interview No. 15, in India (Jan. 2017). 
44.  See Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27. 
45.  CHIRAYU JAIN ET AL., THE ELUSIVE ISLAND OF EXCELLENCE: A STUDY ON STUDENT 
DEMOGRAPHICS, ACCESSIBILITY AND INCLUSIVITY AT NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL 2015–16, at 28, 32 
(2016). 
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higher if they included those who did not report.46 Some 30 percent of NLSIU 
students come from Tier 1 (major) cities, but that is a decline from 50 percent, 
suggesting a more provincial trend although not away from urban settings. Most 
students have parents that are fluent in English.47 There are also a small number of 
students in the “reserved” group for “scheduled castes” and similar groups. The report 
suggests that those with more advantage do better in school, participate heavily in the 
moot court competitions, and get prestigious jobs upon graduation.48 As others have 
suggested, it is very difficult to come from outside the elites and excel in law school in 
India.49 Shamnad Basheer’s creative and tenacious efforts to expand the chances for 
outsiders to gain success in the national law schools illustrate the tremendous obstacles 
they face.50
Parallel to the Indian institutes of technology, the caste elites are not 
distinguished especially by wealth or property, but by an ability to embody the 
accepted meritocratic values. As a scholar of the IITs suggests, “they are able to 
inhabit a universal worldview precisely because of a history of accumulated privilege, a 
history that allows them a unique claim to certain forms of self-fashioning.”51
“Whereas at an earlier moment, status might have been more explicitly tied to caste, 
the social bases of merit continue to be constituted in ways that allow the same social 
groups to inhabit merit as an embodied ideal.”52 They are selected because of their 
achievement—which tends to coincide with caste. 
The legal press in India reports on the high prestige positions that graduates 
obtain from the national law schools. Recently the NALSAR in Hyderabad reported as 
follows. Out of seventy-four graduating students, the fifty-eight who participated in 
the campus recruiting program all got positions. Those positions included ten Shardul 
Amarchand Mangaldas, six Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, five Luthra & Luthra, four 
Trilegal, three AZB & Partners, two Khaitan & Co, two P&C Legal, and two S&R 
Associates, with a few other firms hiring one. On the in-house side, the RPG Group 
hired five, while ICICI Bank hired four students. Others reportedly planned to 
“pursue careers in academia, policy making, judicial and civil services, et cetera.” They 
reported offers to attend “the University of California at Berkeley . . ., the participating 
universities for the European Masters in Law and Economics program, the Faculty of 
Law, Oxford University, and Faculty of Law, Cambridge University, University of 
California at Los Angeles, Cornell University, and the London School of 
Economics.”53 Some planned on taking civil service exams, and was one taking a 
46.  Id. at 28. 
47.  Id. at 35. 
48. Id. at 14–15. 
49.  Shamnad Basheer et al., The Making of Legal Elites and the IDIA of Justice, in THE INDIAN 
LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 4, at 578. 
50.  Id.
51.  Ajantha Subramanian, Making Merit: The Indian Institutes of Technology and the Social Life of 
Caste, 57 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 291, 296 (2015). 
52.  Id.
53.  B. Varun Reddy, NALSAR Class of 2017: Conclusion of Recruitment Process, SCC ONLINE 
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judicial exam. Two reportedly were planning on becoming advocates or clerking for a 
court. Similar results came from the other law schools reporting in the media, 
including Bangalore and Gujarat NLU.54 A dean of a more traditional law school 
noted that the law firms preferred to hire from the national law schools than from the 
traditional schools.55
These data are somewhat misleading, however. First, many leave the law firms 
after a relatively short time. One observer stated that half of the graduates of national 
law schools leave the practice of law within ten years for other careers such as 
business, design, and journalism.56 An examination of the LinkedIn members 
identified with the national law schools in Hyderabad and Bangalore, which seems to 
capture a good portion of the alumni, suggests that many are still in law firms but quite 
a number are in business, in-house, legal education, or alternative careers. NLSIU has 
5,441 alumni listed, which no doubt includes those who have participated in a range of 
programs, but it is interesting that the breakdown includes many or even most in 
careers other than legal careers.57 Clearly a large group is not in legal careers.58 Of the 
legal component, the largest employers listed are the leading corporate law firms and 
the bar. The list shows a number at the top law firms and in the bar, but the numbers 
in relation to the number of graduates is not high. Krishnan’s research on the 
frequency generally of individuals leaving corporate law firms—“peeling off” also 
suggests that graduates are not in general making their careers in the large corporate 
law firms.59
As Krishnan notes, lawyers leave in part because the leading corporate law firms 
generally are of two types: family-dominated or dominated by a few individuals. 
Interviews confirmed this situation today, suggesting that there are very few “true 
partnerships.”60 One young lawyer in a law firm with his father in Mumbai notes that 
family-operated businesses often feel comfortable giving their legal work to the 
children of a longstanding lawyer.61 The new firms started by many of those who leave 
tend then to replicate the structures they left behind.62 Starting salaries are also 
relatively low. A small firm might pay 40,000 Indian rupees per month, a large one 
50,000, and a few firms such as the two Amarchand firms pay some 150,000 rupees a 
month, producing annual salaries of $7,500 to less than $30,000 (often augmented to 
some extent with bonuses). 
BLOG (May 2, 2017), http://blog.scconline.com/post/2017/05/02/nalsar-class-of-2017-conclusion 
-of-recruitment-process/. 
54.  See generally Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27. 
55.  Interview No. 2, in India (Jan. 2017). 
56.  Interview No. 3, in India (Jan. 2017). 
57. Nat’l Law Sch. of India Univ., LINKEDIN (last visited Nov. 17, 2017), https://www 
.linkedin.com/school/15092875/. 
58.  Id.
59.  Krishnan, supra note 41, at 31–32. 
60.  See id.; see also Interview No. 4, in India (Jan. 2017). 
61.  Interview No. 5, in India (Jan. 2017). 
62.  Krishnan, supra note 41, at 8, 54–56. 
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Many who leave the law firms also seek to gain a foothold at the bar by teaming 
up with an established advocate. Krishna shows how difficult it is to make it that way 
and break into the hierarchical advocacy world.63 One of the frequent observations 
about the graduates of the national law schools is that, after almost thirty years of 
producing lawyers, no graduate has become a grand advocate or a judge.64 The 
meritocratic criteria of the national law schools do not so far overcome the strong 
familial capital required for a career at the bar, which then can lead to judicial 
appointments. Indeed, as discussed below, advocates promoting their sophisticated 
expertise can be seen as “too modern for the court” or “incapable of playing by rules” 
because lacking inside knowledge of the rules.65
The world of the bench and bar also has a very strong impact on both the law 
firms and the national law schools, which are embedded deeply in the world of elite 
advocacy and the judiciary. The law firms can be divided into three general categories. 
The first is what Legally India terms the “Big Seven.”66 The big seven law firms gained 
prominence or were established after economic liberalization. They include Cyril 
Amarchand Mangaldas, with 601 lawyers; Khaitan and Co., with 485; Shardul 
Amarchand Mangaldas & Co., with 430; AZB & Partners, with 375; Luthra & Luthra, 
with 336; J.Sagar Associates, with 302; and Trilegal, with 221. They are the most 
important corporate law firms. Another group is the older firms established by 
expatriates in the colonial era, such as Crawford Bayley, established in 1830. Other 
firms in this category include Little & Co., and Mulla & Mulla.67 These were the most 
prominent firms prior to liberalization, but they did not move to adapt to the new 
situation, and a very few partners dominated the firm and the profits. They were 
eclipsed by the newer and more entrepreneurial firms, which also attracted more new 
associates because of the promise —ultimately not realized—that firms would be 
more egalitarian in sharing the profits and partnership places. The remainder of the 
corporate legal sector is comprised of many small firms serving some aspect of the 
corporate business. Still, the current “big seven” has a “quasi monopoly” on major 
transactions.68
For all the law firms, it is necessary to have access to the leading advocates in 
order to be successful for clients in litigation. One of the larger firms reported the 
importance of access to the “face value” of the fifteen or so advocates that they 
utilized.69 Nanda, Wilkins, and Fong note that the older firms survive in part because 
they are so connected with the elite bar. Their niche generally is the places where “old-
line connections and prestige remain salient . . . for big Indian companies”—in 
63.  Id. at 38, 56–57. 
64.  Interview No. 6, in India (Jan. 2017). 
65.  Interview No. 7 (Email) (July 2017). 
66.  A Ranking of India’s 25 Largest Law Firms, LEGALLYINDIA.COM (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:59 P.M.), 
http://www.legallyindia.com/law-firms/india-25-largest-law-firms-by-headcount-00011130-8166. 
67.  Nanda et al., supra note 39, at 72–75. 
68.  Wilkins & Khanna, supra note 23, at 144. 
69.  Interview No. 8, in India (Jan. 2017). 
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particular, real estate and regulatory.70 Furthermore, “[t]hese firms also have long-
standing relationships with many of India’s top grand advocates and high court 
judges”—“when the matter is really sensitive and the CEO needs someone he can 
really trust to navigate the bureaucracy or the courts . . . .”71
There are other ways that the law firms connect to the networks around the 
bench and bar. Two of the most prominent of the big seven law firms, each of which 
has very prominent women in key positions, illustrate familial embeddedness. Pallavi 
Shroff, a key partner in the Delhi firm of Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co., is the 
wife of Shardul Shroff, the chair of the firm and inheritor with his brother of his 
father’s prominent firm. She is also the daughter of well-known retired Supreme Court 
Justice P.N. Bhagwati, one of the justices also most identified with public interest 
litigation. The Shroffs also link closely to the Gujarati community and Reliance, one of 
the major corporate groups.72 Khaitan and Co. similarly is closely connected to the 
Marwari community from Kolkata and Aditya Birla Group.73 Further, Zia Mody, the 
founder of AZB and partners, is the daughter of Soli Sorabjee, another famous Indian 
jurist and former attorney general of India. Mody started the firm after ten years as an 
advocate. Reportedly she became tired of the male-dominated bar and took advantage 
of her University of Cambridge law degree, Harvard LLM, and family capital to start 
what has become one of the most successful law firms in India. 
The law firm sector has grown substantially since economic liberalization, but it 
does not appear to be growing very much today. After an initial expansion of the 
corporate legal services market under liberalization, the market appears to have 
stagnated—perhaps in part because of the limited local opportunities and products 
offered in litigation.74 The corporate law firms in varying degrees are linked up with 
the familial world of the elite bench and bar, even though, as we suggest below, a 
number of those in the corporate bar are also pressing for some change. 
The connection between the elite bench and bar to the national law schools is 
extremely close. The governing boards of the national law schools are dominated by 
members of the elite of the bar and the judiciary. More generally, legal education is 
regulated by the Bar Council—the organ of the advocates. The Bar Council, for 
example, prescribes twenty-six mandatory courses, limits teaching by practitioners, and 
limits class size to sixty.75 It also imposed an all-India bar examination in 2010. 
Leaders of the relatively marginal All India Law Teachers’ Organization argue that the 
Bar Council should have “no role” in the teaching program of the law schools, but 
there is no likelihood of change.76 The Bar Council is still in charge. 
The hierarchical connection between the judiciary and the national law schools is 
70.  Nanda et al., supra note 39, at 74. 
71.  Id. at 75. 
72.  Id. at 78. 
73.  Id.
74.  Id.; see also Interview No. 9, in India (Jan. 2017). 
75.  Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27. 
76.  Interview No. 10, in India (Jan. 2017). 
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even stronger. Key judges generally decide whom to hire as the dean or vice chancellor 
of a national law school. One vice chancellor spoke of meeting a key judge for dinner 
and then getting offered the position.77 According to one knowledgeable observer, 
potential deans “cow-tow to the local judiciary,” forming a “small cabal.”78 The 
chancellor of each school is a judge, with the chief justice of the Indian Supreme 
Court the chancellor of the NLSIU by virtue of the chief justice position. One critic of 
the NLS vice chancellors, in fact, stated that once they are appointed, they spend all 
their time and energy trying to gain stature within the world of the elite bench and 
bar.79 The dependence of each NLS on the vice chancellor’s clout magnifies the 
importance of those ties. Faculties have very weak voices so that the schools are 
“personality driven” by the vice chancellor.80 Interviewees noted that when a capable 
vice chancellor left the NLS Kolkata, for example, the school went back to the “dark 
ages.”81
The influence of the judiciary is quite pronounced. The ability to get local 
government funding, according to interviews, depends on the work of members of the 
judiciary who lobby their local government—which must pay some attention since 
they appear frequently before those judges. It is also quite clear that the funding levels 
for most of the national law schools are not very high, which puts pressure on them to 
increase tuition fees. Finally, the more recently established NLS tend to have 
substantial local restrictions placed on them (e.g., number of students that must be 
local). Recently, legislation that would reserve 50 percent of the NLSIU spots for 
locals has alarmed alumni.82
Very high teaching loads are the norm in the NLS with the major exception 
currently of the NLS Delhi, which is very well funded and focused under the current 
vice chancellor on significantly increasing the research output. More generally, the 
spread of the national law schools has not substantially raised the prestige and profile 
of legal academics in India. Many interviewees noted that there is still no real career in 
legal academia. One law graduate in a different PhD program noted that there is no 
real job as “law professor.” It is a “dead end.”83  The NLS phenomenon, others noted, 
did not change the faculty model of professors as just “teachers.” The “main focus is 
teaching” at the national law schools, even though the teaching itself is not that high 
quality.84 There is “not much time for research,” and there are no “structures to build 
77.  Interview No. 11, in India (Jan. 2017). 
78.  Interview No. 15, supra note 43. 
79.  Interview No. 12, in Australia (Dec. 2015). 
80.  Swethaa Ballakrishnen, Why I Am Not a Lawyer, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN INDIA ESSAYS 
IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR RANBIR SINGH (2014); Interview No. 14, in India (Jan. 2017). 
81.  Interview No. 15, supra note 43. 
82.  Sowmya Aji, Karnataka to Reserve 50 Percent Seats in NLSIU for Local Students, ECON. TIMES
(June 20, 2017, 9:15 P.M.), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/education 
/karnataka-to-reserve-50-percent-seats-in-nlsiu-for-local-students/articleshow/59239084.cms. 
83.  Interview No. 12, supra note 79. 
84.  Interview No. 13, in India (Jan. 2017). 
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up” to promote a better position for faculty members.85 There is little focus on the 
“quality of faculty” or “research agendas.”86 The faculty of the national law schools 
from our observations tends to be relatively young and many faculty members do not 
stay in teaching. The group includes many who did not succeed in litigation and a 
number who are not on the “tenure track.”87
The longstanding effort to upgrade law teaching and legal scholarly research, 
supported by a number of Ford Foundation initiatives beginning in the 1950s, has so 
far had limited success.88 The best and brightest law graduates do not seek careers as 
law professors. There is a recognition among many we interviewed that more legal 
academics are producing research, and the number of academic scholars today is much 
greater than in the past. But interviewees also report that the journals are “dead” and 
that the advances are quite limited.89 While many people in India can name judges or 
senior advocates, legal scholars, with the exception of Upendra Baxi, are unknown 
even in the legal profession.90 The national law schools, moreover, are the relatively 
elite tip of the iceberg. There are more than a thousand other public and private 
schools with lower pay—including a large number of private schools that pay half of 
what the public schools pay.91  Only the private Jindal Global Law School near Delhi 
(“Jindal”), discussed below, and the well-funded national law school in Delhi appear to 
have a commitment to encourage scholarly productivity. 
The pressure to change comes mainly from those who go abroad. Many who go 
become part of a brain drain, but a group of relatively young lawyers with elite 
credentials suggests that more are returning. As noted by one interviewee, 
“increasingly people are coming back,” the legal academy is more “exciting” than in 
the past, and many see “teaching as a vehicle” for research.92 They hope for a 
“recapturing and reinvesting of the brain drain.”93 What they learned abroad and is 
valued abroad, however, is still unevenly recognized or even devalued in India.94  We 
examine these groups below after the discussion of the bar. 
THE BAR
The tightly-connected elite of the bench and bar remains at the top of the legal 
85.  Interview No. 14, supra note 80. 
86.  Interview No. 16, in India (Jan. 2017). 
87. Swethaa Ballakrishnen, Where Did We Come From? Where Do We Go? An Enquiry into the 
Students and Systems of Legal Education in India, 7 J. COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL EDUCATION 133–
54 (2009). 
88.  Lovely Dasgupta, Reforming Indian Legal Education: Linking Research and Teaching , 59 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 432 (2010); see also Ford Foundation: A Legacy of Social Justice, FORDFOUNG.ORG, http:// 
www.fordfound.org/about-us/a-legacy-of-social-justice/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
89.  Interview No. 17, in India (Jan. 2017). 
90.  Interview No. 18, in India (Jan. 2017). 
91.  Interview No. 10, in India, supra note 76. 
92.  Interview No. 19, in India (Jan. 2017). 
93.  Id.
94.  Swethaa Ballakrishnen, Homeward Bound: What Does a Global Legal Education Offer the Indian 
Returnees?, 80 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 2441–80 (2012). 
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hierarchy. It is dominated especially by well-connected elites, including Brahmins and 
upper castes and the Parsi elite in Mumbai.95 The grand advocates are at the top of the 
hierarchy. Galanter and Robinson point out that seniority is part of this relationship.96
Since judges face compulsory retirement at sixty-one (and at sixty-five in the supreme 
court), they are often younger than the senior advocates and may have looked up to or 
even learned their practices from them. As noted above, the elite of the bar and bench 
have a very strong impact on legal education, on the governance of the national law 
schools, on the hiring of the vice chancellors who govern the schools, on the funding 
of the schools, and also in providing social capital that helps make up the elite of the 
corporate law firms. 
The bar has participated in initiatives such as the national law schools and public 
interest litigation that have enhanced the legitimacy of the profession and opened up 
to more meritocratic and high-quality entrants. But it is still a legal elite that is 
essentially inbred and very restrictive in entry. As noted above, the graduates of the 
national law schools have not had much success in this sector of the legal profession. 
The conservative nature of the bar is quite evident. The attitude toward the law 
professors is apparently much like it was traditionally in the UK. The professors are 
not highly respected. One interviewee noted that professors at one NLS sought to 
eliminate Saturday classes in part to encourage research, and the governing board 
rejected the request because, in their opinion, “law professors don’t work anyway.”97
One interviewee noted that there is a “large disconnect between academics and 
practice,” and the feeling of superiority is mutual.98 The narrowness of the prevailing 
view of law practice is captured by a lawyer in a social science PhD program who had 
trouble renewing the license to belong to the bar. The authority thought that 
interdisciplinary academic study about law was inconsistent with the position of 
member of the bar.99
The issue of the quality of the advocacy came up in a number of interviews.100
From the side of the law firms, as noted above, the interviewees reported the need for 
the “face value” of the fifteen or so advocates that they use, but the interviewees also 
say that the abilities of the elite bar are “lower and lower.”101 The problem, in part, is 
that the elite advocates have too many cases. They also do not use technology in their 
arguments. They rely on “court craft” and “no depth.”102 A former law firm lawyer 
suggested a “blinkered vision of law,” that there are very few quality lawyers in the bar, 
95.  Sharafi, supra note 19; see also Interview No. 5, supra note 61 (noting the links between 
Parsi family businesses and Parsi family law firms). 
96.   Galanter & Robinson, supra note 20, at 455–85. 
97.   Interview No. 15, supra note 43. 
98.   Interview No. 19, supra note 92. 
99.   Interview No. 12, supra note 79. 
100. Such concerns were evident also in Galanter & Robinson, supra note 20, at 455–85, and 
in Wilkins & Khanna, supra note 23, at 114, 146. 
101. Interview No. 3, supra note 56. 
102. Id.
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that the bar is “mediocre,” and that “80 percent were unprepared.”103 Interestingly, a 
number also of the in-house counsel studied by Wilkins and Khanna reported “great 
frustration with the quality of these top advocates.”104
Well trained lawyers armed with the experience of Oxford, Cambridge, or US 
law schools, coupled with experience in an international law firm, find that they are 
“overtrained” for litigation in India.105 The senior advocates do not have time for 
complex points, and it is by no means clear that, if they did, the judges would embrace 
them. There is no “market for top level legal argument,” in the words of a senior 
partner in a law firm.106 Arbitration to avoid the courts is no answer, according to the 
same partner, because judgments must be enforced in the courts.107 One young lawyer 
reported that he left the practice of law because of this disconnect between what he 
was trained for and what he could use in litigation in India. 
Interviewees stated that there were some prominent exceptions among the 
bench and the bar. Most frequently named were two justices of the Supreme Court 
from prominent legal families. One is Justice Dhananjaya Yashwant Chandrachud, 
whose father Shri Y.V. Chandrachud was the longest serving chief justice of India. 
Chandrachud graduated in economics and mathematics from St. Stephen’s College in 
New Delhi in 1979, obtained his LLB degree from Delhi University in 1982, and 
obtained an LLM degree from Harvard University in 1983. The other is Justice 
Rohinnton Fali Nariman. Nariman is the son of Fali Sam Nariman, a leading senior 
advocate. The younger Nariman received his early education in Mumbai, with a 
B.Com. degree from Shri Ram College of Commerce. He completed his LLB from the 
Faculty of Law, University of Delhi and then obtained an LLM from Harvard Law 
School. He practiced law in New York for a year as well. His career in India went fast, 
mixing family capital and meritocratic credentials. The bar had to amend the rules to 
allow him to become a senior advocate at the age of thirty-seven. He reportedly is the 
first Harvard alumnus to serve as a justice at the Supreme Court of India. 
Family capital remains vital for careers in the bar and on the bench. The system 
for promotion into the judiciary is secret and subject to some criticism. Selection to 
the high courts and to the supreme court takes place through a closed colloquium and, 
as one observer noted, it results in enduring legal names that tend to be upper caste: 
from Mumbai, as the example of Nariman suggests, among the Parsi elite.108 The 
impact of selection to a high court or supreme court, in addition, endures beyond 
retirement, since retired judges gain many influential positions related to politics and 
the law after their service on the judiciary.109
103. Interview No. 18, supra note 90. 
104. Wilkins & Khanna, supra note 23, at 146. 
105. Interview No. 18, supra note 90. For a similar phenomenon experienced by Indians with 
LLMs from the US, see Ballakrishnen, supra note 87. 
106. Interview No. 3, supra note 56. 
107. Id.
108. Interview No. 12, supra note 79. 
109. For example, Nick Robinson shows that, “In about half of Indian states, including Bihar 
and Madhya Pradesh, there are public ombudsmen called lokayuktas, i.e., ‘People’s Commissioners’ in 
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Interestingly, in a recent speech to the bar association in Mumbai, Justice 
Chandrachud raised some judicious criticisms about the closed nature of the bar.110
After praising the bar as an “assembly line of brilliance,” he talked of “our outmoded 
way of working” and the “perception that the bar is closed.” He lamented the talented 
individuals who “never went to the supreme court,” and argued that it is “an issue of 
grave concern” that there is “talent” with “no access to centers of power.” He stated 
that it was important to “open up our bar to a true meritocracy.” 
The national law schools, as noted, have not provided an effective meritocratic 
pipeline into the elite bar. One leading lawyer with a family firm in Mumbai noted that 
for the leading lawyers in Mumbai, whether practicing in firms or as advocates, the 
likely choice of law schools would be the Government Law College (“GLC”),111 and 
the same would be true for New Delhi with the University of Delhi law faculty.112 The 
reasons are twofold: the exam threshold is difficult to pass for admission to an NLS; 
and the networks around the GLC are essential to success in Mumbai. 
Admission to the GLC is not easy. Many are turned down. Yet several locals 
within the elite legal world noted that children of judges and elite advocates get in 
despite lacking the top credentials. One graduate noted that if one has “no 
connections,” it will be very difficult to find the mentors at the bar necessary for 
success;113 on the other hand, a faculty member says that the GLC students without 
connections have the time and capacity to find them.114 No one disputes the value of 
family capital in careers starting at the GLC. Similarly, neither graduates nor faculty 
argue that there is any real teaching at the GLC. Classes meet from 7:30 a.m. to 10:30 
a.m., and busy practitioners may not show up to teach if something else comes up. 
There is in any event “no need to attend classes.”115 The students essentially spend all 
their time apprenticing with the advocates who congregate at the Bombay High Court 
one block from the GLC. There are conscientious professors nevertheless who help, 
for example, to organize a law review, but scholarly capital pales in importance to 
family capital. Interestingly, however, one faculty member reported that there were 
currently three GLC students at Harvard.116 One administrator noted that leading US 
schools recruit at the GLC, and that as many as 25 percent study abroad—despite the 
lack of academic rigor at the GLC.117 The social capital suffices. 
The portrait of the bar reveals a legal elite that is very inbred and restricted in 
Hindi. These ombudsmen are usually retired High Court or Supreme Court judges.” Nick Robinson, 
Closing the Implementation Gap: Grievance Redress and India’s Social Welfare Programs, 53 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 353 (2015). 
110.  Hon. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Address at the Sesquicentenary Event of the Bombay 
Bar Association (Nov. 19, 2016). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIy02Wrbt0E. 
111.  Interview No. 20, in India (Jan. 2017). 
112.  Gingerich & Robinson, supra note 27. 
113.  Interview No. 12, supra note 79. 
114.  Interview No. 21, in India (Jan. 2017). 
115.  Id.
116.  Id.
117.  Interview No. 22, in India (Jan. 2017). 
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entry. There is no way to mix the legal milieu. The graduates of the national law 
schools, who treat their law degrees similar to the engineering graduates of the Indian 
institutes of technology, have to find another path of meritocracy versus a small subset 
of a national elites around the courts and advocacy. Further, with the growth of trade, 
corporations, and investment, there are opportunities for a professional class to serve 
the state, and big corporations, with new and more “modern” expertise. The law 
firms, as noted, which rebuilt their approach after the era of conveyancing and some 
banking relationships, are one place where some of this upgrading has taken place, but 
they are limited by the world of a very conservative elite bench and bar. These 
challengers likely circumscribe the possibilities for the grand advocates, keep them out 
of some new markets, and therefore limit the opportunities for new advocates to gain 
entry to the rarified levels now dominated by very senior advocates. Those senior 
advocates are still necessary for access to the higher courts, but much energy is now 
spent looking for ways around this path. 
CHALLENGES TO THE ELITE BENCH AND BAR
The challenges and pressures for change tend to come from the outside. As 
noted, at least one of the top supreme court justices, with multiple degrees from 
abroad, has sought to modernize from within. But the highly-internationalized elite are 
the more general source of the change. It includes many who have studied abroad, 
including individuals with Rhodes Scholarships, and a number who have returned 
from the United States or from positions in the English “magic circle” law firms or 
variants in Australia. A good proportion has advanced degrees from the United 
Kingdom, but the United States has become more attractive for study abroad in recent 
years.118 The voices of these relatively young elites are evident in the litany of 
criticisms in the preceding section. As noted, a number of graduates of the NLS have 
teaching and research positions abroad. They, too, participate in these debates. It is 
indicative that a recent review article of law and social science research about India 
emphasizes the work of those who are from India, but work abroad.119 Within India, 
in addition, there are now clear alliances of this internationalized group with business 
and philanthropy promoting a modernized “good governance” within India. 
The leading internationalized law firms within India are part of the offensive. 
One top litigation partner with experience abroad noted the impact of the bar’s 
narrowness. The partner argued that in transactional work the leading law firms could 
grow and take advantage of foreign clients and their own local and transnational 
expertise.120 But in litigation they were still blocked; they could not deploy their 
expertise or their abilities to draw on technological innovations. This mismatch also 
limits the growth of the Indian legal market. Some firms are trying to build their own 
118.  Ballakrishnen, supra note 87. 
119.  Mitra Sharafi, South Asian Legal History, in 11 ANNUAL REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 309–36 
(2015). 
120.  Interview No. 3, supra note 56. 
162 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol.  3:143 
in-house litigation expertise to work with, or go around, the advocates, but the 
possibilities of bypassing are still pretty limited. 
As noted above, the earlier offensive to upgrade legal knowledge, combined with 
social activism, was not very successful despite the efforts of the Ford Foundation.121
The new offensive goes with, and gained momentum with, the economic liberalization 
that began in 1991. The professional milieu around finance and business associated 
with liberalization can take advantage of the mix of social capital and corporate 
connections, but any move into law has been blocked by the insular legal profession. 
This problem is evident from the relatively limited career opportunities even for the 
graduates of the national law schools, who tend to come from the social group with 
resources, but not family legal capital. The “global meritocratic” quality of the top 
graduates is indicated by the high number of NLS graduates who obtain Rhodes 
Scholarships. 
There is a new, legally-educated elite, therefore, and it has its own hierarchies 
and trappings linked to the national law schools. But to jump anywhere past the 
limited extensions that this new elite status can offer (i.e. firms, global organizations, 
think tanks, some in-house positions), or to jump into the mainstream legal elite, 
requires different forms of capital. The law graduates from the national law schools 
have profiles similar in this respect to the graduates of the Indian institutes of 
technology,122 but they do not have the opportunity in India to mix engineering, social 
science, technology and law in the way that it is done in the Silicon Valley, for 
example. 
One potential remedy for the economic liberals is to open up the legal services 
markets, but the Bar has strongly opposed competition from abroad within India.123
There is more momentum now than in the past for a limited opening, but there are 
still “snags.” The opening would undoubtedly have an impact, perhaps in two ways. 
On the one hand, it may weaken the power of the Indian corporate law firms, since 
the global law firms have advantages facilitating large scale transactions. As suggested 
by Wilkins and Khanna, “foreign firms were more likely to handle important matters 
involving M&A, civil liability, and arbitration.”124 The global firms may also attract 
more Indian nationals back to India because of the relative openness of those firms 
for advancement.125 At the same time, as Nanda, Wilkins and Fong point out, the 
traditional firms founded in the colonial era by British lawyers “might actually be seen 
as more valuable” if the market is opened up because of their unique ties with 
regulatory authorities, the grand advocates, and the courts.126
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Many of those who go abroad become interested in research and teaching, and 
they increase some of the pressure within India. Many stay abroad. There are at least 
six individuals teaching in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore.127
As noted before, a number of them nevertheless want to “recapture and reinvest the 
brain drain.”128 They overinvest in technical scholarly sophistication in part because of 
the challenge they face in India to break into the world dominated by the bar. Not 
surprisingly, they often aim their research precisely at the quality of the courts and the 
judiciary, seeking transparency as a way also to challenge the conservatism. As already 
noted, they have not succeeded in breaking down the walls. Scholarly research at the 
national law schools is very limited, including at the top ones, and the position of law 
professor is still not widely respected, and does not offer an attractive career path. 
There is also some upgrading in faculty credentials by emulating the British 
requirement for a PhD to teach at the national law schools. 
Nevertheless, there are some very prominent examples of research successes, 
such as the research at the NLS Delhi on the death penalty, which also provide some 
transparency while drawing on empirical legal research approaches imported from the 
United States. Anup Surendranath, the law professor in charge of the project, is a 
graduate of NALSAR in Hyderabad with an Oxford PhD gained through scholarship 
assistance. His death penalty research led the chief justice of the Indian Supreme 
Court in 2014 to name him the deputy registrar (research) in the Supreme Court of 
India. According to his website, “The only other instance of an academic being invited 
to the supreme court for a similar assignment was almost thirty years ago, in the late 
1980s, under Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati.”129
Other examples are think tanks created by individuals returning from abroad and 
well aware of the limited opportunities to deploy their knowledge and expertise. Vidhi 
represents a particularly notable example.130 According to its website, 
The Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy is an independent think tank doing legal 
research and assisting government in making better laws. Vidhi is committed 
to producing legal research of the highest standard with the aim of informing 
public debate and contributing to improved governance. Vidhi works with 
Ministries of the Government of India and State Governments, as well as 
other public institutions, providing research and drafting support at various 
stages of law-making.131
Vidhi also conducts independent research, including: “Judicial Reform: Research 
in this area takes a data-driven approach to suggesting reforms that address the 
problem of judicial delays.”132
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More than thirty professionals working with Vidhi are listed on the website. The 
research director and founder is Arghya Sengupta, a graduate of the NLSIU and 
Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. His PhD at Oxford was on the independence 
and accountability of the Indian higher judiciary. The credentials of the group are 
stellar, with degrees from the national law schools, US, British, and other graduate 
programs, and experience which includes work with the corporate law firms. 
The genesis of the group was among graduate students in Oxford, who noted 
the “inadequate legal research” that formed the basis of the government’s work on an 
Indian-US nuclear deal.133 The group included two from Oxford, one from Harvard, 
and one from Delhi, and they believed that the there was a “gap in the system.”134 The 
government had high quality input on economics and policy, but not good law. This 
group acted to remedy the problem for the nuclear agreement, and they were 
successful in gaining credibility and attention despite their very young ages. They 
decided to build on this work and create a think tank to occupy the space of high 
quality legal research. They observed that there was no perceived problem in 
government litigation, in any event under the control of the bar, but the quality of 
legal expertise generally needed upgrading. They used their capital from their studies 
abroad and the Rhodes Scholarship, even though only in their early twenties, to find 
independent funding. They were successful, and began in 2013 as the “first legal think 
tank.” They were also very careful to avoid “advocacy” or other activities that could 
taint the “expertise.”135
Suggesting some appetite for an upgrade in legal expertise as part of good 
governance, they succeeded in raising money not from the legal profession but from 
philanthropy, including substantial support from Rohini Nilekani, part of the Infosys 
community. Vidhi does not pay high salaries, but tries to pay roughly half of what the 
associates in law firms make. They work with other disciplines and other think tanks, 
with some circulation among such think tanks as the Center for Policy Research in 
New Delhi. There are also links to the national law schools and to the Jindal Global 
Law School. They belong to the group challenging the traditional, and conservative, 
world of the bench and bar. 
The Jindal Global Law School is the first high profile private law school in India 
and also the first to focus specifically on academic scholarship.136 It is the brainchild of 
Raj Kumar, a representative of the diaspora reinvesting in India. He has degrees from, 
among other places, Delhi, Oxford (where he went as a Rhodes Scholar), Harvard, and 
the University of Hong Kong. In 2009 he became the founding vice chancellor of the 
Jindal Global Law School. Kumar was teaching at the University of Hong Kong, and 
became convinced that the national law schools had not succeeded in bringing Indian 
legal education as far as necessary. In particular, he believed that research was not 
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sufficiently emphasized. Drawing on US capital and US institutions for initial support, 
and drawing on the success of the private Indian School of Business, he went 
searching for philanthropy to build a $100 million private law school. He succeeded, 
ultimately, with the Jindal grant, drawing on wealth generated from the Jindal steel 
empire. Still, tuition had to be set quite high according to Indian standards. It is now 
equal to about $10,000 per year. The school offers a five-year LLB/BA, a three-year 
LLB, and a one-year LLM. 
After beginning with a law school, Jindal Global University now has a business 
school, a liberal arts and humanities school, a communications and journalism school, 
and a school of international affairs. Jindal this way seeks to build interdisciplinary 
connections around law that are missing from the traditional faculties of law and the 
national law schools. Jindal has numerous relationships with schools abroad, and the 
faculty includes a number of expatriates. Notably, some one-third of the faculty 
members are graduates of one of the national law schools. Faculty salaries are 
relatively high for India, and there are centers focused on research. The teaching loads 
are not light, and the scholarly output is a little uneven, but the professors are well-
integrated into the global and, especially, US scholarly worlds.137
A third area challenging the traditional legal knowledge comes not from within 
the various law schools, but rather in the social science departments, especially at the 
prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (“JNU”). There is the Law and 
Social Sciences Research Network (“LASSnet”), organized by the Centre for the Study 
of Law and Governance at JNU, which has held a number of conferences. It draws on 
and challenges legal scholarly capital in several ways. The key individual organizing this 
network is Pratiksha Baxi, a sociologist at the Centre and the daughter of Upendra 
Baxi. This interdisciplinary work offers an option that law graduates may pursue to 
avoid the narrowness of legal scholarship and the precariousness of the law professor 
position. 
This terrain of expertise challenging the conservatism of the elites of the bench 
and bar is mainly a detour around Indian hierarchies. It builds on foreign capital—
especially from the United Kingdom and the United States—to push beyond the 
conservatism. This terrain provides some outlet for the hundreds, or even thousands, 
of individuals who receive good educations yet are locked out of the very conservative, 
and embattled, bar elite. These efforts have not touched the elite of the bar in a 
substantial way to date, but the aging elite of the bar faces a threat that may render 
their enduring conservatism and bunker mentality obsolete. 
The challenge to the traditional bar, it should be noted, should not be portrayed 
as a meritocracy versus inherited legal positions. The challengers themselves have 
substantial resources from within current Indian society and from abroad. Jindal is 
funded by a large business, and it often takes business-generated wealth to attend. It 
takes resources to do well on the tests for admission to the national law schools and to 
build study abroad on NLS degrees. The think tanks, in particular Vidhi, also connect 
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to major businesses seeking to upgrade the quality of governance in India, including 
law. It took connections to that wealth and cosmopolitan capital—Oxford and 
Harvard degrees—to gain entry to those groups and build Vidhi. These approaches 
allow law graduates to branch out and to challenge and perhaps surround the 
traditional elite, but they represent a palace war mainly among elites. 
Compared to the QCs in England who are embedded in oligarchy, politics, and 
the business class, with entry into the knowledge world of Oxford and Cambridge, the 
senior advocates in India appear narrow and embattled. They do not enrich and renew 
their knowledge, which appears to be decades behind the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Contrary to the relatively optimistic conclusion of Galanter and Robinson 
about the status of the grand advocates today,138 that status is hardly the same as 
when, for example, the Parsi in Mumbai and the Brahmins in Madras were central to 
economic and social life on the path to independence. The bar made a comeback 
through the reaction to the emergency and the creation of public interest law, but the 
same individuals who gained credibility at that moment dominate the elite of the bar 
today. 
The elite grand advocates, high court, and supreme court judges face challenges from 
those more attuned to the globally ascendant expertise and set of technologies.139 But 
the embattled elite remain able to assert their influence over many of the ostensible 
challengers within legal education and within the solicitors’ firms. The challengers are 
more meritocratic and less dependent on family capital, and they therefore provide a 
counter movement to the traditionally closed legal profession of India. But the 
challengers, as noted, do not represent the graduates of the more than 1,000 law 
schools that now exist in India. They represent a counter elite, with professional and 
business parents, high caste backgrounds, and resources that allow them to excel on 
the exams necessary to attend the national law schools or Jindal, pay the tuition, and 
gain the international capital necessary to mount challenges to the embedded local 
hierarchies. 
CONCLUSION
Legal education reform in India is closely associated with the legal revolution 
linked to U.S.-style globalization, financialization, and the growth of private markets. 
The rise of national law schools and the Jindal Global Law School are part of that 
revolution, which involves more meritocratic entrance into the profession, upgraded 
legal instruction and faculty credentials, upgraded advocacy, and internationalized and 
interdisciplinary scholarship. The rise operates in tandem with the rise of corporate 
law firms linked to the new law schools. As elsewhere, this more meritocratic course, 
coupled with a great expansion in access to the legal profession, exacerbates inequality 
on the basis of access to such education, upbringing and linguistic skills essential to 
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gain entry into one of the top faculties of law and to elite careers, especially in the 
corporate law firms. The various magic circles of the legal elite are open to only a very 
few with privileged backgrounds. 
The revolution also meets some strong resistance, largely connected to the 
embattled elite in India built on family capital and entrenched in the elite judiciary and 
bar. The resistance of these elites helps prevent the development of academic careers, 
sustained legal and interdisciplinary scholarship, quality teaching, and the higher 
quality of legal argument and advocacy that a relatively young and internationalized 
legal elite seeks to effectuate. With many paths blocked for the young elite, we see 
them using their international capital, and connections to business and philanthropy, 
to build think tanks, a few pockets of interdisciplinary research, and high quality 
faculty in the national law schools, the internationally oriented Jindal Global Law 
School, and in networks in the social sciences. They represent a strong Indian 
challenge to the elite bench and bar, but not so strong at this point that the elite bar’s 
monopolistic returns are threatened. 

